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Abstract 
 
Conflicts of interest between majority and minority stockholders affect a large proportion of 
firms in any economy, but has received little attention in the empirical literature. We examine 
the link between the potential for such conflicts and the firm’s payout policy on a large 
sample of Norwegian private firms with controlling stockholders and detailed ownership data. 
Our evidence shows that the stronger the potential conflict between the stockholders, the 
higher the proportion of earnings paid out as dividends. This tendency to reduce stockholder 
conflicts by dividend payout is more pronounced when the minority is diffuse and when a 
family’s majority block is held by a single family member. We also find evidence that a 
minority-friendly payout policy is associated with higher future minority investment in the 
firm. These results are consistent with the notion that potential agency costs of ownership are 
mitigated by dividend policy when the majority stockholder benefits from not exploiting the 
minority. 
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 1. Introduction 
When stockholders provide the firm with funding, their main concern is a fair return on their 
investment. Conflicts within the firm can threaten to reduce that return. In particular, small 
stockholders may worry that large stockholders will exploit their control to reduce dividends 
and increase private benefits. The incentive to do that comes from the fact that the controlling 
stockholders can appropriate private benefits in their entirety, while dividends have to be 
shared proportionally with minority stockholders. The literature calls this the majority-
minority problem (Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Shleifer and Vishny (1997 )), the horizontal 
agency problem (Roe (1994 )), and the second agency problem (Villalonga and Amit (2006 )). 
Our study is the first to analyze the relationship between dividend policy and stockholder 
conflicts in a large sample of firms with concentrated ownership. These are the firms in which 
stockholder conflicts are likely to be particularly serious.  
 
The inability of dispersed stockholders to prevent managers from expropriating their wealth is 
the core of the first (vertical) agency problem (Roe (1994); Villalonga and Amit (2006 )). 
Most of the existing empirical literature has concentrated on this conflict between 
stockholders and managers (Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Demsetz and Villalonga (2001 )). This 
focus is probably due to the lack of data for firms where the second agency problem is the 
more serious of the two. In public firms, which also have the more restrictive reporting 
requirements, the first agency problem dominates because stockholders are often dispersed. In 
contrast, high ownership concentration and even majority ownership is the rule in private 
firms of any size (Nagar, Petroni and Wolfenzon (2011 )). For instance, the average holding 
of the largest stockholder is 30 % in Norwegian public firms and 78 % in private firms of 
similar size. Among large firms, there is a majority stockholder in 15 % of the public firms 
and in 69 % of the private (Bøhren, (2011)). Thus, the potential conflict between the 
stockholders – rather than between stockholders and managers – is the more pressing agency 
problem for private firms, which constitute an important part of any economy.  
 
The importance of corporate governance for investment and economic development has been 
increasingly recognized in recent years. The OECD, for instance, dedicates a special section 
in its Policy Framework for Investment to corporate governance, and recognizes “two types of 
conflict of interest in corporate governance, one between majority and minority shareholders 
and the other between management and shareholders.” (OECD (2006, 2011), Oman and 
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Blume (2005)). Our study aims to improve the insight by studying in a novel way the conflict 
of interest that has received the least attention in the literature. 
 
The inability to capture conflicts between majority and minority stockholders can be one 
explanation why earlier studies of dividend policy and firm value have produced puzzling 
results (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000)). Moreover, the analysis of 
payout decisions can shed light on the relationship between stockholders by indicating 
whether the owners of controlling blocks behave opportunistically (the “outcome model”) or 
if they instead try to establish a reputation for fair treatment of the minority (the “substitution 
model”). 
 
Our key to a valid test of these two alternative models of payout behavior is to focus on firms 
where one stockholder controls more than half of the outstanding equity. Such majority 
owners have both strong incentives and sufficient power to monitor managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986 )). Thus, the impact of the first agency problem (stockholders vs. managers) on 
dividend payout is minimal in our sample. In contrast, controlling stockholders can influence 
the seriousness of the second agency problem (large vs. small stockholders) by their decision 
to retain or pay out the firm’s free cash flow. 
 
The highest potential for agency costs is when the largest owner holds just above 50 % of the 
equity. At that point, the majority stockholder controls the firm, enjoys the private benefits, 
but receives only about half the cash flow paid out as dividends. Thus the incentive to use the 
firm’s cash flow to finance private benefits is high because the cost is relatively low in terms 
of reduced dividends. As the ownership stake increases, however, the majority’s share of lost 
dividends increases, and the incentive to divert cash for private benefits falls correspondingly. 
Thus, the closer the majority stake is to 100 %, the more the majority internalizes the cost of 
financing private benefits with the firm’s resources.  
 
The two alternative dividend theories have opposite predictions for how dividend payout 
varies with ownership concentration in majority-held firms. In the outcome model, majority 
stockholders will divert cash for private benefits and pay particularly low dividends when a 
large part of the payout would be received by minority owners. Thus, dividends increase with 
increasing ownership concentration in the outcome model. In contrast, the majority 
stockholder in the substitution model wants to create a reputation for not misusing his power, 
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particularly when the potential stockholder conflict is large (i.e., around 50 %). Therefore, the 
expected relationship between dividend payout and the holdings of the largest stockholder in 
the substitution model is negative or flat. Consequently, we study the relationship between 
payout and ownership concentration in order to distinguish between opportunistic behavior 
(the outcome model) and concerns for reputation (the substitution model).   
 
Our evidence supports the substitution model and refutes the outcome model. We find that 
firms with a higher potential for stockholder conflicts pay out a larger fraction of their 
earnings as dividends, particularly when they need new minority investments later on. This 
result holds regardless of whether we measure conflict potential by ownership concentration 
at the individual, nuclear family or extended family level.1 The dividend is also higher when 
one member of the family holds a controlling stake. This suggests that the use of dividends to 
reduce potential agency costs is more pronounced when a majority block is controlled by just 
one person. Since a single individual may find it easier to extract private benefits than a group 
that needs to coordinate such behavior, the finding is in line with the substitution idea. 
Moreover, we find that the payout is higher when minority stakes are less concentrated and 
therefore weaker. All in all, the observed dividend policy is consistent with the substitution 
model also when we account for more detailed properties of the ownership structure. 
 
These findings are independent of whether we measure payout by dividends per unit of 
earnings, cash flows, sales or assets. Moreover, they are insensitive to whether we use the 
propensity to pay dividends or the fraction of earnings paid. They are also similar whether we 
look at all firms or just those that pay dividends in a given year. The results are also robust to 
the use of panel data techniques to control for unobservable firm effects. 
 
Our sample is particularly well suited for this analysis for three reasons. First, we use data 
from the population of all private limited liability firms in the Norwegian economy with a 
controlling stockholder. We therefore have a large and clean sample of firms with widely 
varying majority stakes. This feature increases the power of our test.  
 
Second, our detailed ownership data allows us to assign stockholders to families according to 
alternative family definitions, to capture potential stockholder conflicts within the family, and 
                                                 
1 Extended families are defined based on family relationships up to the fourth degree of kinship. Nuclear families 
include only parents and underage children. 
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to account for the composition of the minority holdings. Compared to just using a standard 
concentration measure such as the equity fraction of the largest individual owner, our richer 
set of ownership characteristics increases the ability to gain deeper and more detailed insight 
into how stockholder conflicts and dividend policy interact. 
 
Third, our time period reflects a regulatory regime of neutral dividend taxation. Thus, we can 
ignore the impact of taxes on dividends, as there are no incentives for stockholders to receive 
dividends rather than capital gains, salary or interest from the firm.2 Similarly, the role of 
dividends as a signal about future expected cash flow is moderate, since every sample firm is 
private, majority-controlled, and has just seven stockholders on average. Thus, dividend 
policy may rather reflect a commitment device for fair treatment of minority stockholders 
rather than an earnings forecast from informed insiders to uninformed outsiders. 
 
We control for a wide set of dividend determinants other than agency costs that can vary in 
the cross-section. Specifically, we account for the firm’s profitability, liquidity, financial 
constraints, growth opportunities, risk, size, and age.  
 
Our findings are in line with previous results suggesting that the private benefits of control 
tend to be fairly low in countries with Scandinavian legal origin. Nenova (2003 ) reports a 
control premium of around 5 % for Norway. This is similar to other Scandinavian and 
common law countries and below the average for German (11 %) and French (25 %) civil law 
countries.  The low premium is confirmed by Dyck and Zingales (2004 ), who relate low 
premiums to media pressure and effective tax enforcement. Norway has the highest 
newspaper readership in their sample of 69 countries, and also has a high degree of tax 
compliance. Using a sample of mergers in Swedish firms, Holmen and Knopf (2004 ) find no 
evidence that controlling stockholders increase their wealth at the minority’s expense. We go 
one step further and show that the low control premium seems justified by the observed 
payout policy, which tends to mitigate rather than increase the potential agency conflict 
between large and small stockholders.  
 
                                                 
2 The tax reform that preceded the period considered in our sample was explicitly designed to ensure the 
equivalence of all cash flows to investors regardless of their formal status (Sørensen (2005, 2007)). This 
alleviates an important concern in our analysis, since the relatively small size and high ownership concentration 
of many private firms in our sample would make it easier to shift between cash outflows with different tax status. 
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Strong legal protection, good availability of information for minority stockholders, media 
pressure, and the intervention of tax authorities that limits private benefits may all reduce 
opportunistic behavior and hence rationalize our findings. Another possibility is, however, 
that majority stockholders anticipate the future need for additional minority equity 
investment. To reduce the cost of such future equity issues, the majority owner tries to 
establish a reputation for fairness. The carrot of easy access to capital thus balances the stick 
of a disciplined payout policy.  
 
We find evidence of such reputation concerns in our data. The positive relationship between 
payout ratios and potential agency costs is driven by the firms that need financing of future 
investment the most. That is, firms pay more dividends out of their earnings now when they 
anticipate a need for more minority equity investment in the future. This also happens when 
the identity of minority stockholders changes, and when the overall share of minority 
stockholders increases.3  
 
Our findings confirm, in a much later sample, the findings of Ostergaard and Smith (2011) in 
a setting where governance regulation was left to private contract. They study the period 
1900-1910, which was just prior to the adoption of the first Norwegian corporate law. 
Analyzing corporate charters in great detail, they find evidence of stronger protection for 
minority stockholders in firms that most needed it, and that dividends and investor protection 
were substitutes. 
 
Our study adds to the limited literature that links ownership structure and payout policy. Most 
of the extant studies have so far looked at owner types rather than owner conflicts. In 
particular, domestic and foreign owners of public firms seem to have different dividend 
preferences (Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001 )). Institutional investors prefer dividend-paying 
companies, but not higher payout ratios (Grinstein and Michaely (2005 )). Moreover, 
institutional investors are sensitive to their own stockholders’ tax brackets when choosing 
among firms with different dividend policy (Desai and Jin (2011)). In a study that does look at 
potential conflicts between stockholders, Faccio, Lang and Young (2001 ) find evidence that 
                                                 
3 In terms of attracting minority investment, high dividend payout can indicate both intrinsic firm quality and the 
reputation for fair treatment of small equity investors. We find evidence supporting both effects. There seems to 
be room for a reputation building effect even when we control for future profitability following high dividend 
payout. 
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pyramids are used to expropriate minority stockholders in East Asian countries, but less so in 
Western Europe. In contrast, we focus on firms which are not part of business groups and 
exploit instead the variability in the share of the controlling stockholder.  
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000 ) have found that dividend payout is 
higher in countries with good protection of minority stockholders. This suggests that a certain 
degree of legal protection is needed to ensure that minority investors get a satisfactory share 
of a firm’s cash flow. In contrast, we study dividend payout for a cross-section of firms within 
a country with strong legal stockholder rights and good enforcement.4 We find that 
controlling stockholders do not restrict payout to minority stockholders. Thus, it appears that 
once basic requirements for the legal protection of stockholders are met, controlling 
stockholders find it useful to abstain from opportunistic behavior.  
 
The contrast between these cross-country results and our findings does not seem to be simply 
due to a favorable institutional regime. Reputation effects seem to play a significant role in 
our Norwegian sample. This suggests that the importance of market (reputation) -based as 
opposed to institutions-based solutions to agency problems is an interesting area for future 
research. 
 
The literature on payout policy in private firms is recent and very limited. Michaely and 
Roberts (forthcoming) use a large sample of private and public UK firms and find that the 
dividend payments of private firms are less smoothed than in public firms. Moreover, firms 
with sole or family ownership pay dividends that are close to the residual dividend predicted 
by the irrelevance theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961). They conclude that “ownership 
structure and incentives play key roles in shaping dividend policies”. Focusing on one of the 
main agency problems in private firms, we provide strong evidence of those roles in our 
study.5 
 
                                                 
4La Porta et al.(2000) find that investor protection inherent in the commercial law is on average strongest in 
common law countries and weakest under civil law of the French type. The German and the Scandinavian civil 
law traditions fall in between. Based on seven stockholder right characteristics, Norway gets the highest score of 
the Scandinavian countries and the highest average score on the rule of law, including the maximum score on 
enforcement. 
5 In terms of the classification of the companies in their study, we present a close-up image of firms that are 
similar to their socalled “wholly owned” firms. 
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The remaining part of our paper is organized as follows. The data set and the sample selection 
procedure are described in section 2, whereas section 3 establishes the base-case model, 
defines empirical proxies, and presents summary statistics. The statistical tests for the base-
case are presented in section 4, while section 5 reports robustness tests. Section 6 examines 
the evidence on reputation effects, while section 7 concludes.  
          
2. Data and sample selection 
The data set is based on the population of firms with limited liability in Norway. The data 
quality is unusually high, as the law mandates a standardized set of full accounting statements 
certified by a public auditor for every firm regardless of listing status, size, and industry. 
Failure to submit this information within 17 months after fiscal year-end triggers automatic 
liquidation by the court. We know every ultimate ownership stake (i.e., direct stake plus 
indirect stake through intermediaries) in every firm. The data includes family relationship by 
blood and marriage between all owners, directors, and the CEO.6 
 
Our starting point is the population of private firms with limited liability.7 To get a suitable 
sample for our purpose, we add the following sampling restrictions: 
1. Financial firms are excluded to avoid the impact of their regulatory capital 
requirements and special accounting rules. We also exclude utility and public 
administration firms, and in general firms where the government is the majority 
stockholder. 
2. We ignore subsidiaries in business groups, since dividends in such firms may 
primarily reflect intragroup transfers. Thus, dividends may be paid for different 
reasons than those governing dividends to non-parent stockholders, such as a concern 
for cash and risk management for the group as a whole.  Moreover, expropriation 
within business groups has already been examined by Faccio, Lang and Young (2001 ) 
based on data from East Asia and Western Europe.8 
3. To avoid non-operative firms, a sample firm must have positive sales, assets, and 
employment. 
                                                 
6 Accounting, ownership, and board data are delivered by Experian. Data on family relationships are from 
Skattedirektoratet. All data items have been received in electronic form. 
7Since listing status may matter for the firm’s dividend policy, for instance via an easier access to equity 
markets, we exclude public firms from the sample. Adding the very few listed firms with concentrated 
ownership does not change our results. 
8 Unlike other countries (e.g. Sweden) business groups are not widespread in Norway. Neither are multiple stock 
classes (Ødegaard (2007)). 
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4. The firm must have consistent accounting statements. For instance, total assets need to 
equal total liabilities plus stockholders’ equity. 
5. Given the focus of our paper, the firm must have a majority owner. This means more 
than 50 % of the share capital must be held by a family with one or more stockholders, 
or by a firm whose owners cannot be identified.9 Since our data base includes all firms 
in the economy, we can base this majority filter on ultimate ownership.10 Our concern 
is the total dividend the stockholder receives from a firm, whether directly or 
indirectly.  
6. Single-owner firms are excluded, since such firms have no stockholder conflicts.11 For 
similar reasons, we exclude the smallest 5 % of firms by assets, sales, and 
employment. 
 
We are interested in the potential conflict between majority and minority stockholders, 
studying the extent to which controlling stockholders share free cash with the minority. 
Therefore, we use a sample of firms where we can clearly identify a controlling block. Our 
test is based on keeping control of the firm constant while exploiting the variation in cash 
flow rights. In order to keep this focus, we ignore blockholders unless they hold a majority 
stake. Since we want to avoid ambiguity concerning control, we also ignore potential block 
holder coalitions in the spirit of Laeven and Levine (2008). Instead, the coalition we deal with 
is the easily identifiable one based on family relationships.  
 
In addition to agency costs, a firm’s dividend policy may reflect other determinants, such as 
financial constraints, profitability, and taxes. Our regression models account for their 
influence by using a series of control variables, except for tax concerns, which are better 
handled by the sampling procedure. In particular, we focus on the dividend payments based 
on accounting statements for the period 2006-2009. This is shortly after a tax reform which 
eliminated a serious tax distortion of dividend policy.12 The tax reform produced the same 
                                                 
9 This would be a financial or a foreign investor. Since we do not know the identity of foreign investors, we can 
neither trace their ultimate ownership nor assign them to families. 
10 In the vast majority of cases, the ultimate owner in our sample is an individual or a family. Therefore the 
results from running our tests just on family firms are almost identical to those reported in the paper. Our main 
results also hold in the subsample of firms controlled by financial institutions or foreign investors. 
11 Including the fairly large number of single-owner firms does not alter our results. In fact, it accentuates the 
inverse relationship between the share of the controlling stockholder and dividend payout. 
12 The tax reform had its first effect on dividends for the accounting year 2005, which was paid in 2006. We do 
not use the numbers for 2005 (the first year after the reform) in our study, as we are interested in the post-reform 
equilibrium rather than in temporary tax reform effects. Dividend payments are quite high in the year prior to the 
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effective tax rate on dividend income, capital gains, and interest income, and the rate is also 
very close to the one on labor income. Hence, differences in dividend policy across our 
sample firms are not driven by tax concerns. 
 
Applying these filters, we end up with a base sample of between 10,272 and 13,140 firms per 
year. Table 1 shows the details. 
 
 
3. Model, empirical proxies, and summary statistics 
The basic model is the following: 
 
(1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7it it it it it it it it itDiv Con Liq Pro Fin Risk Size Ageα β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + +ψ  
 
Our measure of dividend payout, Div, is cash dividends to after-tax operating earnings. This is 
the classic dividend payout ratio, which we use when testing the base-case model in section 4. 
However, majority stockholders may choose to underreport earnings and hence inflate the 
classic payout ratio in order to hide cash diversion from minority stockholders. To reduce this 
bias, the robustness tests in section 5 alternatively measure Div by the ratio of dividends to 
cash flows, sales, and assets. The approach is similar to the one used by La Porta et al. (2000). 
 
Ownership concentration, Con reflects the potential seriousness of stockholder conflicts in 
majority-controlled firms.13 This is the key independent variable in our model. Since the 
potential agency cost decreases with Con in our sample, the predicted coefficient 1β in (1) is 
positive under the outcome model and non-positive (negative or zero) under the substitution 
model.  
  
We measure Con in the base case as the ultimate share held by the largest owning entity, 
which may be a family, a native financial institution or a foreign investor of any type. A 
family consists of either a single individual or several individuals related by blood or marriage 
                                                                                                                                                        
tax reform and quite low the year after, indicating a shift of cash outflows to preempt the tax increase that was 
part of the reform. Nevertheless, including 2005 in our sample does not significantly change the results. 
13 We have also examined the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between concentration and payout by adding 
the square of the largest share. The added term is usually insignificant. 
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who all own stock in the firm.14 We use two alternative family definitions. The wide 
definition in the base case includes individuals related by blood or marriage up to the fourth 
degree of kinship. The more restricted nuclear family definition only includes parents and 
underage children. A final proxy for the stockholder conflict is the holding of the largest 
separate owning unit rather than the family. Unlike in the family-based definitions, every 
individual is considered a separate owner. We use this alternative measure to explore whether 
the family per se matters for how dividend policy is used to influence stockholder conflicts.  
 
We also account for ownership dispersion inside the controlling family. Conflict potential 
within the family is measured by a dummy variable which is one if one family member has 
majority in the firm and zero otherwise. Similarly, we include measures for the relative power 
of minority stockholders. For instance, mote dispersed minority investors may find it more 
difficult to coordinate and monitor controlling stockholders. We use the Herfindahl index for 
minority stockholdings to capture the bargaining power of minority stockholders outside the 
controlling family. We expect that under the substitution model, dividends will be higher 
when there is a controlling family member and when minority concentration is low. The 
outcome model predicts the opposite.  
 
Firms with more liquid assets, Liq, are more likely to pay higher dividends. They can make 
the payment at lower transaction costs than others, and they may also have more cash on hand 
than what is needed for operations, investment and financing (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 
(2006 )). Along the same lines, firms with higher profitability, Pro, may be more likely to pay 
out a larger share of their earnings. Therefore, we predict a positive coefficient for both Liq 
and Pro, which are proxied for by the cash-to-assets ratio and the return on assets, 
respectively.  
 
Fin reflects constraints on the firm’s ability to finance its cash outflow. This constraint may 
be more restrictive on dividend payments the higher the firm’s growth prospects. For a given 
level of profitability and asset liquidity, we predict a negative relationship between dividends 
and Fin, which we measure by the realized sales growth over the previous three years. The 
robustness tests explore the effect of alternatively measuring Fin by asset turnover and by the 
interest coverage ratio. Generating very high sales per unit of assets could indicate high 
                                                 
14 As mentioned above, our findings are quite similar if we restrict the sample to firms where the majority 
stockholder is a family. 
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investment needs. Similarly, a low coverage ratio may reflect limited reserves available for 
dividend payout and possibly binding dividend covenants. 
 
It has long been argued that firms pay dividends from what they consider their permanent 
earnings (Lintner (1956 )). Therefore, firms with more risky (volatile) earnings will be less 
likely to pay high dividends. This is also consistent with the maturity hypothesis of Grullon, 
Michaely and Swaminathan (2002 ), which states that dividend increases are associated with 
reduced firm risk. We predict a negative relationship between dividends and risk, Risk, which 
we measure by the volatility of the firm’s sales revenue over the past seven years.  
 
Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002 ) argue that risk decreases and operations mature 
as the firm becomes larger and older. This can lead to higher dividends. Fama and French 
(2001 ) find that large firms are more likely to pay dividends. Thus, we expect that dividends 
relate positively to firm size and firm age. These two variables, Size and Age, are measured by 
the log of sales and by the log of the number of years since the firm was founded, 
respectively. Finally, we control for industry effects by dummy variables representing the 
main industries in our sample. 
 
We estimate (1) on the sample of all firms, i.e., both payers and non-payers. Just like the firms 
that pay dividends, those that choose not to pay represent one particular way of handling the 
potential stockholder conflict. For instance, the more nonpayers (i.e., very low payout) there 
are around 50 % ownership concentration compared to 90 %, the more the data would support 
the outcome model. Therefore we also estimate a payout propensity model where the 
dependent variable is whether or not the firm pays a dividend. The independent variables in 
that model are identical to those used in (1).  
 
Table 2 reports summary statistics. On average, about one fourth of the firms pay dividends in 
a given year. The mean payout ratio is about 20 % for the sample as a whole and 70 % for the 
payers. As in recent samples of listed US companies (Fama and French (2001 )), the median 
firm does not pay dividends. The largest holding in a majority-owned firm is on average 60 % 
when every owner is a separate unit, 63 % if they are assigned to nuclear families, and 72 % 
when we use the wide family definition. There is one person in the family holding a majority 
stake in the firm in three out of four majority cases, and the average minority concentration 
outside the family is high as reflected by a Herfindahl index of 0.85. The dividend and 
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ownership variables are all stable over time. The control variables are also quite stable, 
possibly reflecting the muted impact of the recent global financial crisis on the Norwegian 
economy. 
 
4. Statistical tests 
Section 4.1 reports our findings for the base case, while section 4.2 analyzes the effect of 
modeling the potential stockholder conflict in alternative ways.  
 
Table 3 shows that, except for some of the alternative ownership concentration proxies, the 
correlations between the independent variables are generally low. Thus, multicollinearity will 
not be a problem in the regressions. Notice also that the correlation coefficient between the 
share of the largest family under the wide and the narrow definition is only around 0.5. Thus, 
it may be important to check whether the results are sensitive to the way stockholder conflicts 
are measured. 
 
4.1 The base case  
Table 4 shows the base-case estimates. The table reports the findings year by year, for the 
pooled sample, and for the Fama-MacBeth approach constructed from the year-by-year 
estimates (Fama and MacBeth (1973 )).  
 
The year-by-year estimates reflect a very stable relationship between dividends and potential 
dividend determinants. Hence, these estimates are very similar to those based on the pooled 
sample (All) and on the Fama-MacBeth (FMB) approach. Since the same stability prevails in 
every subsequent analysis in this paper, we only report the Fama-Mac Beth estimates in the 
following. The annual estimates are available upon request. 
 
The table documents an inverse relationship between dividend payout (dividends to earnings) 
and ownership concentration (the ultimate holding of the largest owner, which is either a 
family, financial firm or foreigner). Thus, firms tend to pay lower dividends as the share of 
the controlling stockholder increases. This result is at odds with the outcome model 
(opportunistic behavior), but consistent with the substitution model (non-opportunistic 
behavior). Hence, the data supports the notion that the controlling stockholder uses dividend 
policy to mitigate rather than amplify potential agency conflicts with fellow stockholders 
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inherent in the firm’s ownership structure. Such behavior may be rationalized economically 
by the value of a reputation for loyalty and trust among minority stockholders. These qualities 
may be particularly important when the majority anticipates the need for future equity issues. 
 
The relationship between dividend payout and the control variables is largely as predicted. 
For a given ownership structure, higher dividends per unit of earnings are paid by larger firms 
and by firms with higher cash holdings, higher profitability, and lower risk. The role of firm 
age and past sales growth is insignificant.  
 
Hence, the relationship between ownership concentration and dividend payout is negative and 
statistically significant. In terms of economic significance, the effect is rather moderate. To 
illustrate, suppose ownership concentration increases from its mean value of 72 % by one 
standard deviation (14 %) to a level of 86 %. Then, the expected payout ratio decreases by 
around 2 percentage points, or by around 5 % of its own standard deviation. The size of the 
decrease is not critical for our story, however, as even an insignificant relationship is 
consistent with the substitution model. 
 
Overall, the base-case model shows that the relationship between the share of the dominant 
stockholder and dividend payout is inverse, statistically significant, and stable. This supports 
the substitution scenario, which predicts that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and dividends is negative or flat. 
 
4.2. Stockholder conflicts 
The base-case estimates in table 4 measure potential conflicts of interest between the 
stockholders by the largest equity fraction held by a family, financial institution or foreigner. 
However, our data allows for a deeper analysis of how ownership and dividends interact. As 
shown in table 5, our tests use alternative definitions of the controlling entity (models I and 
II), consider what happens to dividends when the majority faces a diffuse versus a 
concentrated minority outside the family (III), and analyze the impact of potential conflicts 
within the family (IV). 
 
The base-case definition of a family is quite wide, as it includes relationships by blood and 
marriage up to the fourth degree of kinship. Model I uses a narrower measure based on 
nuclear family, which we define as parents and underage children. Table 3 showed that this 
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proxy is not very strongly related to the base case measure. Nevertheless, model I in table 5 
documents that the narrow family definition produces estimates very close to those under the 
base case. Thus, the strictness of the family definition is not driving our results. 
 
Model II goes further by measuring ownership concentration based on separate holdings 
rather than family holdings. Thus, whereas a family with five owning members represents one 
owner in table 4, it is five different owners in model II of table 5. Like for model I, however, 
the estimates show that the base-case results remain unchanged. Thus, the substitution model 
is consistent with the data also when large investors are not grouped into families. The family 
unit per se is not critical to our major result. 
 
The ability of the largest stockholder to extract private benefits may depend not just on the 
majority’s ownership stake, but also on the structure of the minority. If minority stockholders 
are fragmented, they may find it more difficult to monitor, coordinate, and put pressure on the 
majority to reduce their consumption of private benefits. Correspondingly, it may be more 
tempting for the majority to exploit the minority. We use the Herfindahl index to measure 
fragmentation among minority stockholders. The estimates reported in model III show that the 
coefficient of the minority concentration measure is negative and significant. Hence, the 
tendency to mitigate agency conflicts with dividend policy depends not just on the holdings of 
the largest owner, but also on the minority structure. The more diffuse the minority 
stockholders as a group, the higher the payout ratio they receive. Again, this supports the 
substitution model. 
 
So far we have treated the family as one block. However, there may be family members who 
disagree on how the payout policy should be used to influence agency conflicts. We account 
for this possibility by a dummy variable which equals unity if an individual within the largest 
family owns at least 50 % of the firm’s shares, and zero otherwise. The family member 
holding such a majority stake does not need to coordinate with others on the family to ensure 
a majority vote at the stockholder meeting. At the same time, however, this setting involves a 
high potential conflict with the remaining owners in the family. Thus, there is possibly a 
minority problem within the family. 
 
The coefficient on the dummy variable in model IV is positive and significant. That is, for 
given ownership concentration, firms are more likely to pay out more of the earnings to 
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minority investors outside as well as inside the family when the largest owner is strong within 
the family. This is further evidence in support of the substitution model. 
 
Summing up, we find that regardless of how we define the largest stockholder, the base case 
results from section 4.1 survive. This is also true when we account for the internal structure of 
the family, ignore family relationships altogether, and when we account for the composition 
of minority stockholders as a group. Having one person with a majority stake in the firm 
inside the family or being faced with a diffuse minority block increases the tendency to pay 
high dividends. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that dividends play a 
role in mitigating potential conflicts between stockholders that are created by the firm’s 
ownership structure. 
 
The Fama–MacBeth results are confirmed when we control for non-observable dividend 
determinants by running balanced panel regressions in table 6.15 We run regressions with just 
firm effects as well as both firm and time effects. Not surprisingly, the panel results in the first 
two columns are almost identical. The next two columns show quite similar results using the 
alternative measures for ownership.16 
 
5. Robustness 
The findings in section 4 support the substitution model. However, one may worry that the 
diversion of cash for private benefits may induce the controlling stockholder to underreport 
the earnings in order to inflate the classic payout ratio. Such a practice would bias the classic 
payout ratio of section 4 upwards in firms where the actual stockholder conflict is made larger 
by the firm’s dividend policy. Thus, our test may be biased against the outcome model. 
Therefore, as in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000 ), we alternatively 
normalize dividends by cash flow, sales, and assets.  
 
According to the three first columns of results in table 7, the negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and dividends from the base case is reproduced by each alternative 
payout measure. Thus, any attempt by majority stockholders to manage earnings downwards 
in order to inflate the classic payout measure and hence hide private benefits does not 
                                                 
15 Since the ownership structure is quite persistent at the firm level, we choose random effects rather than fixed 
effects to control for firm-specific non-observables.  
16 Using alternative definitions of payout, as will be specified in section 5, again produces similar results.  
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materially bias our major result in the base case. The only difference occurs with some of the 
control variables. Whereas the firm’s liquidity and profitability always have positive and 
significant coefficients, the picture is more mixed for the remaining control variables. 
 
The proxy for financial constraints is not statistically significant in the base case. The fourth 
column of table 7 uses asset turnover (sales to assets) rather than past sales growth as a proxy. 
Firms that generate high sales with their existing assets may have a higher need to invest, 
which may make them more financially constrained. The estimates show that the basic 
relationship between ownership concentration and dividends is upheld. Moreover, like in table 
4, financial constraints have no material effect on dividend payout. 
 
We also use the interest coverage ratio as a measure of financial constraints. The results are 
shown in the fifth column of table 7. Firms whose earnings are low relative to their interest 
payments could be prevented from paying high dividends. This may be due to a bank 
covenant or simply the lack of cash. Our results indicate that higher interest coverage ratios 
are indeed associated with higher dividend payments. Nevertheless, the effect of the 
ownership concentration measure and that of the other controls does not change when we add 
the coverage ratio.  
 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006 ) show that dividend payments are related to the 
proportion between total retained earnings and total equity. This is because more mature firms 
that are profitable and have lower growth opportunities should make higher cash distributions. 
We add their measure to our set of controls in model VI and find that while it has the 
anticipated positive sign, it does not alter results for the other variables. 
 
Not paying dividends is as relevant as paying dividends for the relationship between dividend 
policy and agency costs. Therefore, our regressions have so far included both dividend payers 
and non-payers. Still, the relationship between stockholder conflicts and dividends may be 
different for payers and non-payers. Moreover, as we showed in table 2, most firms in our 
sample do not pay dividends in a given year. Therefore, model VII reestimates the base-case 
model on the subsample of dividend payers. The estimates show that just like for the full 
sample, there is an inverse relationship between ownership concentration and dividends. The 
same result turns up in model VIII, where we estimate a logit model in which the dependent 
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variable is whether or not the firm pays a dividend. The independent variables in this payout 
propensity model are identical to those using fraction paid as the dependent variable. 
 
Stock repurchases have become an important form of payout for large US firms (Grullon and 
Michaely (2002 )), but were not allowed in Norway until 1999. Repurchases are still rare 
events in private firms. We construct a measure of repurchases from the firm’s equity 
accounts and re-estimate the basic model on the firms that do not show evidence of stock 
repurchase activity. This restriction reduces our sample size only slightly. The estimates 
confirm the secondary role of repurchases for our firms. Results for the non-repurchasing 
subsample in model IX are basically identical to those using the full sample. 
 
Overall, these robustness tests show that the inverse relationship between ownership 
concentration and dividend payout is insensitive to how we normalize dividend payout, 
measure financial constraints, take account of non-payers and stock repurchases, and whether 
we predict the propensity to pay dividends or the amount paid. 
 
 
6. Reputation effects 
The results in the previous sections reflect a robust, statistically significant, and economically 
modest relationship between the potential for agency problems and firm payout. One possible 
explanation is that the institutional framework discourages opportunistic behavior. This is 
consistent with existing findings about stockholder protection in Nordic countries. For 
instance, rigorous media scrutiny can be an effective deterrent. Good tax enforcement may 
prevent the misreporting of accounting numbers and reduce the extraction of private benefits. 
Explicit legal protection of minority investors, combined with good enforcement, can have a 
similar effect. 
 
Even with good institutions, however, the potential for agency problems may not be 
eliminated. There may still be some room for reputation concerns in payout policy. We may 
still observe that controlling stockholders who anticipate the need for sustained equity 
investment in their firm try to establish a record of fair treatment of minority investors. Along 
similar lines, Gomes (2000) models managerial reputation effects in the context of IPOs and 
potential cash flow diversion. 
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If reputation concerns are important, one should observe more minority-friendly dividend 
payout in firms that anticipate the need for new minority investment. Therefore, we relate 
dividend policy to subsequent equity investment in order to test the relevance of the 
reputation channel. In particular, we first regress dividend payout ratios on the usual controls, 
which are liquidity, profitability, financial constraints, risk, firm size, age and industry: 
 
(2) ܦ݅ݒ௜௧ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ߚଵܮ݅ݍ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶܲݎ݋௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܨ݅݊௜௧ ൅ ߚସܴ݅ݏ݇௜௧ ൅ ߚହܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܮ݅ݍܣ݃݁௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 
We run cross-sectional regressions of (2) for the first three years (2006-2008) in our sample. 
Next, we collect residuals. i.e., the unexplained part of dividend payout, and take the average 
residual for each firm over the three years. This residual payout is then regressed on variables 
that include reputation concerns measured in the final sample year (2009): 
 
(3) ܴ݁ݏܦ݅ݒ௜ ൌ  ߛ ൅  ߠଵ ܥ݋݊௜௧ ൅ ߠଶ ܥ݋݊௜௧  ൈ  ܴ݁݌௜௧ ൅ ߴ௜௧  
 
where Repit is a measure of reputation incentives. We use the following proxies: 
- The issuance of new equity, measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the relative 
increase in paid-in capital is above 20 % and zero otherwise.  
- The change in the identity of minority stockholders. New minority investors might 
need to see a satisfactory dividend track record before they are willing to invest in the 
firm. We use a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a new minority investor enters the 
firm in 2009 and zero otherwise. 
- The decrease in the stake of the largest stockholder. We use a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the stake of the largest stockholder is lower in 2009 than in 2008 and zero 
otherwise.  
 
The results are presented in table 8.17 We find that the coefficient on ownership concentration 
taken separately is not significantly different from zero. However, the interaction term with 
reputation concerns is always negative and is significant when we use the indicator for  
increases in equity and the one for decreased stake for the largest stockholder.  
 
                                                 
17 The results in table 8 are based on a sample where the identity of the largest stockholder (measured as a 
nuclear family) is the same in 2009 as in 2008. This gives us a cleaner sample, since we avoid some the possible 
overlap with signaling concerns in dividend policy. It is also closer to the idea of long-run reputation. Using the 
larger sample without this particular restriction does not change our results.  
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The findings imply that the strong substitution-type relationship between dividend payout and 
the share of the controlling owner is more likely in firms with reputation incentives. Because 
these firms plan to get additional minority investment, they follow a dividend policy which is 
minority-friendly rather than opportunistic. 
 
Of course, a high dividend paid by firms which are active in equity markets could signal 
intrinsic firm quality as well as a reputation for good treatment of minority investors.18 The 
two are not mutually exclusive. We examine how they influence payout in model IV of Table 
8. We regress the same residual dividends on ex post profitability (a proxy for signaling), the 
indicator for the decreased stake of the majority stockholder (a proxy for the need for 
reputation), the interaction between the two, and the lagged ownership concentration. Both ex 
post profitability and the decreased stake of the majority stockholder associate positively with 
payout. The lagged ownership concentration is insignificantly different from zero. This 
indicates that even when we control for the need for signaling and the need for reputation in 
light of high future minority participation, there is still no evidence of opportunistic behavior. 
 
Summing up the results in this section, we find evidence of majority stockholder reputation 
effects on dividend policy even in a country with strong minority protection. Thus, legal rules 
and reputation concerns are not necessarily substitutes. This conclusion, which is consistent 
with the substitution model, is interesting, given the well-known cross-country results in favor 
of the outcome model. Our findings also point to the need for future research in order to better 
understand the role of formal versus informal protection of minority investors. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The relationship between stockholder conflicts and dividend policy within a given legal 
regime has barely been addressed in the empirical literature. Our paper analyzes a large 
sample of private firms with majority owners and finds that the higher the potential for 
stockholder conflicts as reflected in the ownership structure, the more of the firm’s earnings is 
paid out as dividends. This holds regardless of how we measure conflict potential and 
                                                 
18 Signaling models (for instance Bhattacharya (1979)) suggest that dividends could be costly signals of firm 
quality. Moreover, many models link higher share turnover with higher signaling incentives. The mechanism 
based on the different tax treatment of dividends and capital gains (John and Williams (1985), Bernheim and 
Wantz (1995), Allen et al. (2000)) is not likely to be at work in our sample. Still, there may well be room for 
dividend signaling. 
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dividend payout. Thus, majority stockholders use dividends to reduce agency costs rather than 
to increase them by opportunistic behavior. 
 
These findings contrast with evidence from a comparative analysis of dividend policy across 
different legal regimes (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000)). That study 
supports the prediction that majority owners behave opportunistically when the law allows for 
it.  In contrast, our findings suggest that within a legal regime where minority stockholders are 
well protected by the regulator, the majority finds it in their own interest to voluntarily abstain 
from opportunistic behavior and instead use dividend policy to reduce the potential for agency 
conflicts.  
 
The incentive for such behavior may be the need to issue new equity to minority investors in 
the future. Our analysis does indeed find that a less opportunistic dividend policy is associated 
with higher minority equity investment in the future. Reputation incentives may therefore 
complement a minority-friendly institutional framework. Our findings point to the need for 
future research on the role of formal and informal protection of minority investors. 
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Characteristic 2006 2007 2008 2009
Dividend propensity 0.253 (0.000) 0.310 (0.000) 0.251 (0.000) 0.243 (0.000) 0.262 (0.000) 1.000 (1.000)
Dividends to earnings 0.188 (0.000) 0.223 (0.000) 0.171 (0.000) 0.181 (0.000) 0.189 (0.000) 0.729 (0.747)
Dividends to sales 0.018 (0.000) 0.021 (0.000) 0.016 (0.000) 0.015 (0.000) 0.018 (0.000) 0.067 (0.049)
Dividends to cash flow 0.278 (0.000) 0.343 (0.000) 0.245 (0.000) 0.215 (0.000) 0.268 (0.000) 1.220 (0.876)
Dividends to assets 0.036 (0.000) 0.044 (0.000) 0.034 (0.000) 0.031 (0.000) 0.036 (0.000) 0.137 (0.110)
Holding of largest owner 0.632 (0.640) 0.603 (0.600) 0.606 (0.600) 0.606 (0.600) 0.613 (0.600) 0.605 (0.600)
Holding of largest extended family 0.703 (0.670) 0.724 (0.700) 0.728 (0.700) 0.725 (0.700) 0.719 (0.692) 0.711 (0.680)
Holding of largest nuclear family 0.643 (0.650) 0.623 (0.619) 0.627 (0.620) 0.626 (0.618) 0.630 (0.625) 0.621 (0.607)
Majority owner in largest family 0.828 (1.000) 0.739 (1.000) 0.739 (1.000) 0.739 (1.000) 0.765 (1.000) 0.764 (1.000)
Minority concentration 0.876 (1.000) 0.851 (1.000) 0.842 (1.000) 0.836 (1.000) 0.853 (1.000) 0.839 (1.000)
Liquidity 0.239 (0.174) 0.245 (0.186) 0.243 (0.174) 0.250 (0.187) 0.244 (0.181) 0.329 (0.303)
Profitability 0.092 (0.086) 0.101 (0.099) 0.075 (0.079) 0.061 (0.064) 0.083 (0.082) 0.193 (0.174)
Financial constraints 0.121 (0.085) 0.136 (0.099) 0.140 (0.096) 0.095 (0.063) 0.125 (0.086) 0.146 (0.109)
Risk 0.301 (0.205) 0.302 (0.210) 0.300 (0.209) 0.300 (0.211) 0.305 (0.212) 0.260 (0.184)
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Age 2.652 (2.639) 2.661 (2.639) 2.679 (2.639) 2.699 (2.708) 2.671 (2.639) 2.730 (2.773)
Average sample size 10.902 8.982 8.917 8.473 37.064 9.836
This table shows the mean and median (in parentheses) of variables used in the empirical analysis. Dividend propensity is the fractio
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where kinship is limited to spouses and underage children. Majority owner is 1 if the largest extended family has an owner with sh
concentration is the Herfindahl index for all but the largest owner, where an extended family counts as one owner. Liquidity is cash
profit after taxes divided by assets (ROA), and Financial constraints is measured as average sales growth over the past three years. R
over the past seven but minimum three years. Size is sales in million NOK, and Age is the log of the number of years since the firm w
liability firms with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets. We ignore su
smallest 5% firms by assets, sales or employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratios are winsorized
Financial constraints, and Risk are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5%.
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Table 4: The base-case regression
Independent variable 2006 2007 2008 2009
Ownership concentration -0.154 (0.000) -0.156 (0.000) -0.135 (0.000) -0.140 (0.000) -0.145 (0.000) -0.146 (0.000)
Liquidity 0.194 (0.000) 0.233 (0.000) 0.277 (0.000) 0.321 (0.000) 0.256 (0.000) 0.258 (0.003)
Profitability 0.612 (0.000) 0.704 (0.000) 0.500 (0.000) 0.605 (0.000) 0.600 (0.000) 0.605 (0.001)
Financial constraints -0.022 (0.198) -0.008 (0.669) -0.021 (0.207) -0.022 (0.260) -0.017 (0.057) -0.018 (0.012)
Risk -0.087 (0.000) -0.095 (0.000) -0.055 (0.000) -0.046 (0.002) -0.074 (0.000) -0.071 (0.009)
Size 0.030 (0.000) 0.031 (0.000) 0.019 (0.000) 0.015 (0.000) 0.025 (0.000) 0.024 (0.009)
Age -0.019 (0.001) -0.016 (0.010) -0.001 (0.847) 0.013 (0.040) -0.008 (0.011) -0.006 (0.489)
R2 0.309 0.379 0.336 0.323 0.334 0.334
Sample size 10.837 8.904 8.780 8.331 36.852 38.152
This table reports the estimates for the base-case OLS regressions as specified in model (1) of the main text. The p-values are shown
dividends divided by earnings. Ownership concentration is the largest equity stake in the firm held by a financial firm, a foreigner, or an
by blood or marriage. Liquidity is cash holdings to assets, Profitability is operating profit after taxes over total assets (ROA), and Fin
growth over the past three years. Risk is the standard deviation of sales growth over the past seven but minimum three years. Size is the
th th fi f d Th ll i t li it li bilit fi ith j it t kh ldo e num er o years s nce e rm was oun e . e samp e s a pr va e m e a y rms w a ma or y s oc o er, con
employment, and assets. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales or employees, an
stake. The payout ratio is winsorized at 0% and 98%. Liquidity, Profitability, Financial constraints, and Risk are winsorized at 0.5% an
year-by-year regressions, the pooled sample regression (All), and the Fama MacBeth (FMB) regressions with the adjusted R2 and the sam
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Table 5: Accounting for multiple owner characteristics
Model
Independent variable I II III
Ownership concentration -0.118 (0.002) -0.156 (0.000)
Ownership concentration nuclear -0.131 (0.002)
Ownership concentration individual -0.135 (0.001)
Liquidity 0.262 (0.002) 0.267 (0.002) 0.263 (0.002) 0.247 (0.006)
Profitability 0.600 (0.001) 0.597 (0.001) 0.626 (0.001) 0.610 (0.001)
Financial constraints -0.022 (0.023) -0.022 (0.035) -0.021 (0.053) -0.027 (0.024)
Risk -0.072 (0.003) -0.069 (0.004) -0.072 (0.010) -0.080 (0.014)
Size 0.024 (0.010) 0.024 (0.007) 0.025 (0.010) 0.026 (0.007)
Age -0.010 (0.196) -0.011 (0.161) -0.008 (0.368) -0.009 (0.356)
Minority concentration -0.025 (0.000)
Majority owner in largest family 0.006 (0.015)
2 334. 335. 343 342. .
Sample size 29.884 28.281 32.511 33.530
This table reports the OLS regression estimates for extended versions of model (1) in the main text. The p-values are shown in p
dividends divided by earnings. Ownership concentration is the largest equity stake in the firm held by a financial firm, a foreig
members related by blood or marriage. Ownership concentration nuclear (model I) uses the equity fraction of the largest family u
underage children. Ownership concentration individual (II) is the equity fraction held by the largest individual stockholder (fin
Minority concentration (III) is the Herfindahl index for all but the largest owner, where an extended family counts as one owner. M
the largest extended family has an owner with a share above 50% and zero otherwise. Liquidity is cash holdings to assets, Prof
total assets (ROA), and Financial constraints is measured as average sales growth over the past three years. Risk is the standard dev
but minimum three years. Size is sales in million NOK, and Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was founded. The
with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets. We ignore subsidiaries, f
5% firms by assets, sales or employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratio is winsorized
Financial constraints, and Risk are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5%. The table reports Fama MacBeth regressions for 2006 to 2009
the pooled regression.
0 0 0 0
n in parentheses. The dependent
I uses both firm and year random
ldings. Ownership concentration is
by blood or marriage. Liquidity
as average sales growth over the
log of sales in million NOK, and
a majority stockholder, consistent
smallest 5% firms by assets, sales
Liquidity, Profitability, Financial
Table 6: The base-case model estimated with panel methods
Independent variable
Model
I II III IV
Intercept -0.111 -0.162 -0.144 -0.148
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Ownership concentration -0.155 -0.116 -0.085 -0.081
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.010)
Liquidity 0.306 0.308 0.297 0.301
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 0.454 0.439 0.463 0.452
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial constraints 0.019 0.017 0.019 0.018
(0.343) (0.378) (0.393) (0.429)
Risk -0.040 -0.043 -0.036 -0.035
(0.023) (0.016) (0.063) (0.080)
Size 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.035
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 002- . 001- . 004 005- . - .
(0.766) (0.861) (0.636) (0.590)
R2 0.086 0.083 0.085 0.083
Sample size 3.735 3.735 3.064 2.902
This table reports the random effects regression estimates for the basic model (1) in the main text. The p-values are show
variable in Model I and Model II is cash dividends divided by earnings. Model I uses firm random effects, while Model I
effects. Model III uses the nuclear family definition for ownership concentration, while model IV uses individual shareho
the largest equity stake in the firm held by a financial firm, a foreigner, or an extended family with owning members related
is cash holdings to assets, Profitability is operating profit after taxes to assets (ROA), and Financial constraints is measured
past three years. Risk is the standard deviation of growth of sales over the past seven but minimum three years. Size is the
Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was founded. The sample is all private limited liability firms with
accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner firms, the
or employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratio is winsorized at 0% and 98%.
constraints, and Risk are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5%.
1.654 -5.781
0
he dependent variable is dividends to cash flow
as the dependent variable. Sales to assets (S/A)
s the ratio between retained earnings and total
l VIII is a logit regression for the propensity to
gest equity stake in the firm held by a financial
fitability is operating profit after taxes to assets
of sales over the past seven but minimum three
private limited liability firms with a majority
firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales or
ofitability, Financial constraints, and Risk are
 the pooled regression.
Table 7: Robustness tests
Model
Independent variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Intercept
(0.002) (0.000) 
Ownership concentration -0.198 -0.007 -0.026 -0.144 -0.174 -0.145 -0.236 -1.665 -0.148
(0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.005) (0.000)
Liquidity 0.394 0.028 0.065 0.258 0.216 0.258 0.097 1.512 0.257
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.037) (0.003) (0.003)
Profitability 1.151 0.087 0.183 0.599 0.835 0.604 -0.164 7.531 0.608
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.248) (0.000) (0.001)
Financial constraints 0.032 0.004 -
) (0
0.004
.002) 
-0.019 -0.421 0.215 -0.018
(0.013) (0.076 (0.091) (0.000) (0.026) (0.033)
Risk -0.103 0.000 -0.004 -0.073 -0.108 -0.070 0.253 -0.858 -0.072
(0.011) (0.992) (0.079) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.047) (0.000) (0.009)
Size 0.032 0.000 0.004 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.032 0.348 0.024
(0.024) (0.133) (0.009) (0.015) (0.018) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Age -0.020 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 0.042 0.248 -0.005
(0.276) (0.016) (0.122) (0.635) (0.878) (0.489) (0.277) (0.007) (0.521)
Financial constraints (S/A) -0.001 
(0.570)
Financial constraints (ICR)  001.
(0.029)
Retained earnings to total equity 0.005
(0.001)
R2 0.235 0.323 0.366 0.333 0.34 0.33 0.072 0.334
Sample size 35.039 37.049 37.054 37.064 25.188 36.843 7.733 37.273 36.119
This table reports the regression estimates for modified versions of model (1) in the main text. The p-values are shown in parentheses. T
in model I, Dividends to sales in model II, and Dividends to assets in model III. Models IV-VII and model IX use dividends to earnings
and the interest coverage ratio (ICR) are alternative proxies for financial constraints in models IV and V, respectively. Model XI add
equity to the base-case model (1). Model VII is the base case model for the subsample of firms with positive dividends, whereas mode
pay. Model IX shows the results for firms that are not repurchasing shares during the sample period.Ownership concentration is the lar
firm, a foreigner, or an extended family with owning members related by blood or marriage. Liquidity is cash holdings to assets, Pro
(ROA), and Financial constraints is measured as average sales growth over the past three years. Risk is the standard deviation of growth
years. Size is the log of sales in million NOK, and Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was founded. The sample is all
stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positive sales, employment, and assets. We ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner
employees, and firms where the government holds a majority stake. The payout ratio is winsorized at 0% and 98%. Liquidity, Pr
winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5%. The table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions for 2006 to 2009 with the adjusted R2 and sample size from
dent variable in all models is the
nd age of the firm for the years 2006
family where individual owners are
therwise, where change in equity is
o 1 if there has been a change in the
al to 1 if the share of the largest
est stockholder's entity fraction in
e sales, employment, and assets. We
overnment holds a majority stake.
Table 8: Reputation
Model
Independent variable I II III IV
Intercept -0.015 0.092 0.073 0.036
(0.821) (0.172) (0.279) (0.610)
Ownership concentration (OC) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.379) (0.334) (0.606)
OC * Equity issue -0.002
(0.068)
OC * Minority change -0.001
(0.956)
OC * Lower majority -0.002
(0.002)
Lower majority 0.181
(0.001)
Return on equity (ROE) 0.015
(0.000)
Lower majority * ROE 0.014
(0.076)
Lagged ownership concentration 0.000
(0.978)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 3.805 3.805 3.805 3.805
The table reports the OLS regression estimates for model (3) in the main text. The p-values are shown in parentheses. The depen
average residual from regressing dividend payout on the measures of liquidity, profitability, financial constraints, risk, size a
to 2008. Ownership concentration is the largest equity stake in the firm held by a financial firm, a foreigner, or a nuclear
related by blood or marriage. Equity issue is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the change in equity is above 20% and zero o
paid-in capital in 2009 compared to 2008, normalized by total equity in 2009. Minority change is a dummy variable equal t
identity of minority shareholders in 2009 compared to 2008 and zero otherwise. Lower majority is a dummy variable equ
stockholder is lower in 2009 than in 2008. ROE is return on equity in 2009, and lagged ownership concentration is the larg
2008. The sample is all private limited liability firms with a majority stockholder, consistent accounting figures, and positiv
ignore subsidiaries, financials, single-owner firms, the smallest 5% firms by assets, sales or employees, and firms where the g
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